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Financing Chinese Capitalism: Principal Banks, Economic Crisis,
and Chinese Family Firms in Singapore
Abstract: It is a widely circulated myth that Chinese family firms rely exclusively on kinship ties
and network capital to finance their domestic and international operations. In this empirical
paper, I argue that large Chinese family firms are increasingly engaging with financial markets on
a global scale. In order to finance their transnational business activities, these firms require
financial services from banks beyond their domestic economies, resulting in a growing number
and geographical spread of their principal banks. Second, I contend that as these Chinese family
firms are diversifying their principal banks beyond a narrow confinement to other Chinese
family-owned banks and financial institutions, their corporate performance will improve over
time. Drawing upon time-series data (1996, 1998, and 2001) on over 150 Chinese family firms
listed on the Singapore Exchange, I discuss both the geographical origins of their principal banks
and the impact of the selection of these banks on their corporate performance before and after the
1997/1998 Asian economic crisis. I also show whether there is a relationship between the use of
principal banks by these Chinese family firms and their shareholding structures.

Introduction
For several centuries, millions of ethnic Chinese in East and Southeast Asian economies
have engaged in a distinctive form of economic organization through which an informal array of
Chinese entrepreneurs, traders, financiers and their closely-knit networks of family members and
friends came to dominate the economic sphere of the very host economies they later considered
“home”.1 While deeply rooted in the cultural norms and values of the traditional Chinese society
in mainland China, this form of economic organization has evolved and adapted to dramatically
different institutional contexts and political-economic conditions in the host economies, and,
more recently, dynamic processes of economic globalization. In this paper, I use the term
“Chinese capitalism” to describe this historically- and geographically-specific form of economic
organization that refers to the social organization and political economy of the so-called
“overseas Chinese”2 living outside mainland China, particularly in East and Southeast Asia (i.e.
Hong Kong, Taiwan, Singapore, Indonesia, Malaysia, the Philippines, and Thailand). Chinese
capitalism is a dominant mode of economic organization in East and Southeast Asia because of
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not only its economic significance in the domestic economies, but also its complex and, yet,
intricate social organization and authority systems. The sheer diversity and prowess of economic
activities controlled and coordinated by these ethnic Chinese has enabled some of them to
become the very foundations of their home economies. For example, Hong Kong-based Li Kashing, whose empire controls about 16 % of Hong Kong’s stock exchange index (up from 12.7%
in 1988 recorded in Redding, 1990: Table 7.4), caused the index to fall by 1.6 % on 23 December
1998 with his remarks about the unfriendly business environment in Hong Kong (The Straits
Times, 23 and 24 December 1998). In another example, Wee Cho Yaw, the second-generation
banker from Singapore, and his family-controlled United Overseas Bank succeeded in taking
over the fourth largest Singapore bank (Overseas Union Bank) on 26 October 2001. After the
acquisition, the Wee family held controlling stakes in at least 14 companies publicly listed on the
Singapore Exchange (10% of all listed Chinese family firms). UOB became the largest bank in
Singapore, with an international network comprising 273 offices in 18 countries in the AsiaPacific region, Western Europe, and North America.
Amongst these glorified examples of unprecedented success of Chinese capitalism is a
major paradox. It is a widely circulated myth that Chinese family firms rely exclusively on
kinship ties and network capital to finance their domestic and international operations. If the
economic prowess of these Chinese families becomes so significant and pervasive today, how is
it that they managed to grow from small family businesses to giant transnational corporations
within such a short period of time (often within one to two generations)? Even more paradoxical
is the fact that most of this growth has taken place in developing economies in East and Southeast
Asia that have weakly developed financial markets and banking systems. To unlock this mystery
about the success of Chinese capitalism, we need to identify not only the sources of their first
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“pots of gold”, so to speak, that enabled their early establishment and proliferation in domestic
economies. But more importantly, we need to explain the fundamental basis of their successful
transformations from small-scale family businesses to transnational corporate giants. In this quest
for the fundamentals, we have to link the growth and development of Chinese family firms to
financial markets – domestic and international. This linking is necessary because no matter how
cooperative is the family network, there is a limit to the extent in which the network can provide
capital and finance at such a huge scale required for dominating the domestic and regional
economies.
In this paper, I aim to make an initial attempt to examine the ways in which Chinese
capitalism is financed and their impact on corporate performance. I have chosen to focus mainly
on publicly listed Chinese family firms, their principal banks, and their performance during the
1996-2001 period. As prime movers of domestic economies, publicly listed Chinese family firms
are an ideal representation of Chinese capitalism. Their dynamic interactions with and
adaptations to the global economy also allow for an analysis of the transformations in Chinese
capitalism in a global era (see also Yeung, 2004). Their very public nature means data and
information about their financial activities are more readily available than privately owned family
businesses throughout the Asian region. Drawing upon time-series data (1996, 1998, and 2001)
on over 150 Chinese family firms publicly listed on the Singapore Exchange, I discuss both the
geographical origins of their principal banks and the impact of the selection of these banks on
their corporate performance before and after the 1997/1998 Asian economic crisis. I also show
whether there is a relationship between the use of principal banks by these Chinese family firms
and their shareholding structures.
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Two initial propositions can be put forward here. First, I argue that large Chinese family
firms are increasingly engaging with financial markets on a global scale. In order to finance their
transnational business activities, these firms require financial services from banks beyond their
domestic economies, resulting in a growing number and geographical spread of their principal
banks. Second, I contend that as these Chinese family firms are diversifying their principal banks
beyond a narrow confinement to other Chinese family-owned banks and financial institutions,
their corporate performance will improve over time. This argument is particularly relevant during
the recent 1997/1998 Asian economic crisis because the collapse of several leading Chinese
family firms were explained by their excessive reliance on the so-called “network capital” or – as
Krugman (1998) argued – crony capitalism.3 In the next section, I outline the basis on which
these propositions are made by offering a critical evaluation of the existing literature on Chinese
capitalism. I then analyze the nature and geography of the principal banks employed by listed
Chinese family firms in Singapore. The penultimate section discusses the relationships between
their use of principal bankers, the role of family shareholding, and their corporate performance
before and after the Asian economic crisis. Some implications for understanding the changing
nature of Asian financial markets are offered in the concluding section.

Network Capital in a Global Era
During the past fifteen years or so, social science studies of Chinese capitalism have
produced a large body of literature on the nature and organization of Chinese capitalism.4 I have
critically reviewed this literature elsewhere and will not repeat here again (see Yeung and Olds,
2000a; 2004). Suffice to say that one of the most dominant interpretations amongst the various
approaches has been the culturalist perspective that views Chinese capitalism as essentially
organized around family-owned and controlled firms. Once established in East and Southeast
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Asian economies, these Chinese family firms are seen as autonomous agents capable of selfreproduction through (1) unfettered diversification under the whim of the founders or the
patriarchs, (2) reliance on personal relationships and networks for capital, finance and business
opportunities, and (3) relentless pursuit of political-economic alliances with domestic political
elites. In her recent book on Chinese big business in Southeast Asia, Brown (2000: 42) concluded
that “the cultural embeddedness of Chinese capitalism is a product of historical cultural factors.
Chinese capitalism in Southeast Asia, despite its heterogeneity, is not competitive. The
accumulative, predatory tendencies of Chinese capitalism should not be mistaken for
competitiveness. The Chinese links with the state, indigenous merchants, local elites and native
technocrats, have varied from co-opting elites onto the boards of Chinese companies, to raising
equity from indigenous sources, government capitals, to operating joint ventures with the state
and with foreign multinationals and seeking technological alliances with foreign multinationals.
The state has ranged from patron to partner, from investor to executor”. She further argued that
“links with the state and the exploitation of Chinese networks ensured the survival of Chinese
family enterprises, irrespective of whether they were in labour intensive industries or in capital
intensive sectors. Competition was not a determining factor in the survival of Chinese family
enterprises” (p.100; see also Yoshihara, 1988).
How much then do we know about the financial aspect of Chinese capitalism? I think our
knowledge remains rather limited for several reasons. First, much of the culturalist literature
takes on an essentialist view of Chinese capitalism and therefore focuses narrowly on financial
transactions among ethnic Chinese and their family networks. This view is premised on the
essentialist assumption that ethnic Chinese, by virtue of their “Chineseness”, are culturally
predisposed to transact with each other, even in the realm of financial arrangements (e.g.
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McElderry, 1986; Nyaw and Chang, 1989; Brown, 1990). Clearly, this essentialist reading of the
enormously diverse financial activities of Chinese family firms is problematic in today’s
globalizing world in which financial capital flows much more effortlessly across borders and
many Chinese family firms have much better knowledge and access to global financial markets.
Taking an anti-essentialism perspective, for example, Nonini and Ong (1997: 3-4) argued that
“Chineseness is no longer, if it ever was, a property or essence of a person calculated by that
person’s having more or fewer ‘Chinese’ values or norms, but instead can only be understood
only in terms of the multiplicity of ways in which ‘being Chinese’ is an inscribed relation of
persons and groups to forces and processes associated with global capitalism and its modernities”
(see also Nathan, 1993; Greenhalgh, 1994; Hodder, 1996; Dirlik, 1997; Ong, 1997; Yao, 1997;
Ma, 2003). There is thus nothing invariably inherent about ethnic Chinese and their culture that
compel them to rely only on network capital. The concept of culture in Chinese capitalism needs
to be reconceptualized as a repertoire of historically- and geographically-specific practices that
respond and adapt to changing local, regional and global circumstances rather than as
permanently fixed mental and organizational structures that resist challenges and pressures to
change (see also Hwang, 1987). Yang (2002: 469; original italics) contended that “it is better to
treat guanxixue [the practice of relationships] not as an innate timeless given of Chinese culture,
but as a historically situated set of cultural practices whose features and discourse have different
meanings and different deployments in given historical moments and political contexts”. The
essentialism in the culturalist perspective is particularly problematic because “it creates and
legitimises the notion of ‘the Chinese’ as a distinct entity which can be explained by the implicit
application of laws and forces which are presumed to exist” (Hodder, 1996: 12-3). To Wang
(1999: 119), “Chineseness is of little interest unless it is changing or is forced to defend itself
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against change. And underlying the changes that have been the most meaningful for them
[Chinese in mainland China] this past century are the forces of modernization”.
Second, most studies tend to see the organization and behavior of Chinese family firms
and their business networks as a somewhat static product of cultural adaptation – an inwardoriented defense strategy in order to survive host country hostility, or of institutional structuring
– a fixed and pre-determined outcome of the so-called “Chinese business system” (Whitley,
1992; 1999; cf. Yeung, 2000a; 2004). Once established, such firms and their business networks
are perceived to exhibit little internal and external transformations, but rather continue to exist as
relatively “closed” (albeit evolving) socio-cultural formations, often anchored in one national or
regional base. There are no provisions for change and transformation among Chinese family
firms within the same “home” economies and across different Asian economies. It is as if these
firms have a particular fate or destiny, depending very much on their cultural origins and/or
institutional structures that almost leave a permanent imprint on these capitalist organizations.
This static analysis of Chinese capitalism has much to do with its Weberian origin. Max Weber,
for example, had argued that the significant influence of Confucian values in Chinese social
thought was detrimental to the development of a rational instrumentalism essential to the rise of
modern capitalism in North America and Western Europe:
The patrimonial nature of administration and legislation created a realm of unshakeable
sacred tradition alongside a realm of arbitrariness and favouritism. These political factors
impeded development of industrial capitalism, sensitive to the lack of rational and
calculable administration and law enforcement, whether in China, India, Islam, or
elsewhere… Capital investment in industry is far too sensitive to such irrational use of
authority and too dependent upon the possibility of calculating in advance the steady and
rational operation of the state machinery to emerge under a government of this type. But
the decision question is, why did this administration and judiciary [in Imperial China]
remain so irrational from a capitalist point of view?… Rational industrial capitalism,
which in the Occident found its specific locus in manufacturing, has been handicapped
not only by the lack of a formally guaranteed law, a rational administration and judiciary,
and by the ramifications of a system of rights to collect revenue, but also, basically, by the
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lack of spiritual foundations. Above all it has been handicapped by the attitude rooted in
the Chinese ‘ethos’ and peculiar to a class of officials and aspirants to office (Weber,
[1920] 1983: 82-84; my emphasis).
Third, while small-scale Chinese family firms continue to receive the majority of research
attention from academics, few resources have been devoted to the analysis of the growth of large
business conglomerates (with public listed arms) that are controlled by ethnic Chinese (see
Yeung, 1998; Gomez, 1999; Olds and Yeung, 1999; Zang, 1999; 2000; Brown, 2000; Yeung and
Soh, 2000). These large business conglomerates are certainly more than the methodological
proxy that “distinguishes any particular variety of capitalism” (Whitley, 1999: 65). They are
indeed the prime movers and shakers in the economic organization of Chinese capitalism such
that they cannot be analyzed simply as outcomes of abstract cultural norms and institutional
structures in a post hoc manner. Instead, these large Chinese business conglomerates must be
analyzed as an integral and critical constituent of Chinese capitalism. My empirical analysis in
the next section therefore sheds light on how large Chinese family firms are engaging with global
financial markets through their use of principal banks. As two Business Week editors recognized,
“[a]s more and more Chinese network builders popped up each year in Forbes’ list of
billionaires, there came a point when they began to shake their stigma of being ‘ersatz
capitalists.’ Western investment bankers and consultants who learned more about the inner
workings of a Dhanin Chearavanont, Li Ka-shing, Mochtar Riady, or Peter Woo found that these
were serious business empires. They were men with a love for big deals who controlled powerful
intelligence networks that gave them an inside track on deals” (Clifford and Engardio, 2000: 74).
Even in Taiwan where small and medium enterprises (SMEs) have been hailed as the backbone
of the burgeoning economy (see Hamilton and Kao, 1990; Shieh, 1992; Hamilton, 1998; Hsing,
1998), recent studies have shown an increasing concentration of corporate power in the hands of
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the largest business groups, most of which are owned and controlled by Chinese families and are
publicly listed on Taiwan’s stock exchange. Amsden and Chu (2002: Table 2-1; 27), for example,
showed that the share of sales/GNP by Taiwan’s top 100 business groups has increased from
32.3% in 1973 to 33.8% in 1988 and a staggering 54% in 1998. Similar trend towards corporate
concentration in sales, equity and assets is also occurring in other economies dominated by ethnic
Chinese business firms.
Finally, there are few studies on the changing nature of capital sourcing for business
expansion. This is a significant weakness in the context of the spread of global commodity chains
driven by transnational corporations throughout the Asia-Pacific region, and the growth of
regional equity and bond markets. Such regional equity and bond markets are heavily dependent
upon the operation of Chinese family-controlled conglomerates. These regional financial
markets, via digital technologies, provide real-time links between Chinese family firms and the
skein of global financial centers. Thus, while Fields’ (1995) study devoted a substantial chapter
to corporate finance among Taiwanese firms before the 1990s, little substantial and quantitative
data were provided to illuminate the nature of corporate finance. Instead, he conceded that “no
comprehensive study of guanxiqiye [related enterprises] financial sources has been attempted.
Nor can such a study be carried out as long as such financial information remains confidential. In
fact, one of the motives for choosing the informal, ‘related enterprise’ mode of organization has
been to facilitate unmonitored financial flows to the groups and among group firms” (Fields,
1995: 145). In another study of corporate networks among a sample of 107 Chinese business
firms listed on the Stock Exchange of Singapore in 1992, Zang (1999: 864-865) found that “in
the big Chinese business sector in East and Southeast Asia, the interlocking directorate has
replaced traditional informal networks and has performed the function of co-ordination and
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control in the market place. It is a modern form of maintaining personal relationships in the
Chinese business community and embodies a class alliance among Chinese capitalists”. He also
found that family firms are more likely to network than non-family firms, and family ownership
has a positive effect on interlocking directorates (see also Zang, 2000). But he fell short of
describing and explaining corporate finance and performance among these Chinese family firms.
In brief, the study of how Chinese family firms mobilize global capital via domestic and
international financial markets does not really exist yet (see, however, Shikatani, 1995; Olds and
Yeung, 1999; Yeung and Olds, 2000b; Carney and Gedajlovic, 2002).
How then should we approach the financing of Chinese capitalism in a global era? I argue
that it is important to go beyond an essentialist focus on small-scale Chinese family firms and
their reliance on network capital among family members and close friends. This call for an
alternative focus on large Chinese family firms operating across borders does not negate the
significance of earlier work in the culturalist genre. Rather, it builds on our existing
understanding of the role of network capital in explaining the rise and growth of Chinese family
firms in developing Asia economies where capital markets used to be poorly developed and
financial institutions were so intertwined with politics and nation-building initiatives. As these
Asian economies have leapfrogged in their technological and economic development during the
past two decades, many of their leading Chinese family firms have conceivably gone out of their
“cultural mould” and adopted new management and financial practices that were previously
unthinkable. Such transformations in Chinese capitalism do not happen only in such international
financial centers as Hong Kong and Singapore (Wu and Duk, 1995), but also increasingly in such
emerging financial markets as Taiwan, Malaysia and Thailand. In many of these economies, there
is an interesting juxtaposition of old and new financial practices among Chinese family firms.
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Some of these new financial practices include (1) tapping into non-Chinese international financial
institutions for term loans and equity funds; (2) raising capital through public share offering and
international bond listing and; (3) attracting international equity investors.
Key Asian cities act as source points to the global financial system, particularly prior to
the 1997/1998 Asian economic crisis. Hong Kong and Singapore, for example, have long served
as the “twin capitals” for ethnic Chinese firms (Wu and Duk, 1995; Enright et al., 1997; Wu,
1997). Both financial centers have also better than median shareholding protection (see La Porta
et al., 1999: Table 2; 492), despite the large number of Chinese family firms listed on their stock
exchanges. In the loan syndication business, the two financial centers have catered to customers
from different geographic regions. While the US$117.5 billion worth of syndicated loans
arranged by Hong Kong-based financial institutions between 1992 and mid-1996 were more than
double of that of Singapore, 71.7% of this total was accounted for by borrowers from East Asia,
many of whom were ethnic Chinese entities. In Singapore, the borrowers were mainly from
Southeast Asia that together with local borrowers, took up 88.5% of Singapore’s total syndicated
lending of US$54.6 billion during the same period (Wu, 1997: 13-5). Between 1993 and 1994,
financial institutions in Hong Kong and Singapore arranged US$6.5 billion and US$8.6 billion
worth of syndicated loans for Indonesian and Thai companies respectively. Of the total US$38.4
billion worth of funds under the custody of Singapore’s fund managers at the end of 1993, some
40% originated from Southeast Asian countries. The bulk of these funds might have come from
high net-worth ethnic Chinese and their cash-rich corporate entities (Wu and Duk, 1995: 26).
Among various financial institutions in these Asian economies, banks seem to occupy a
particularly important position, not least because many of them are Chinese family-owned and
controlled. Table 1 shows that the shares of banks in financial intermediation in Singapore,
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Taiwan, Indonesia, Malaysia and Thailand during the 1994-1995 period were particularly high
when compared to their counterparts from the US. Foreign banks were also very significant in
Hong Kong and Singapore, accounting for around 80% of total assets in the banking sector. In
Table 2, there are clear differences in the density and role of banks in Hong Kong and Singapore.
While Hong Kong enjoyed the presence of more than double the number of banks per 1,000
population than Singapore, the total bank loans in Hong Kong were also significantly larger than
in Singapore even after we have taken into account of their exchange rate differences. The same
observation can also be found in the different stock market turnovers and their ratios to GDP
during the 1990s. These preliminary data indicate the analytical need to focus on banks in the
development and transformations of Chinese capitalism in East and Southeast Asia. In the case of
publicly listed Chinese family firms, their relationships with domestic and foreign banks become
an important nexus in our examination of their changing financial practices and performance, as
evident in the following two sections.
******************
Tables 1 and 2 here
******************

Chinese Family Firms and Their Principal Banks
Before I present an analysis of the data on the 157 Chinese family firms listed on the
Singapore Exchange (formerly the Stock Exchange of Singapore), some notes on the
methodology of data collection are necessary. The 1996 data on these 157 Chinese family firms
were originally collected and analyzed in Yeung and Soh (2000). We went through the entire
pool of public-listed firms manually. The pool of selection came from a total of 355 Mainboard
and Sesdaq firms listed in Companies Handbook 1997, published by the Stock Exchange of
Singapore (1998). Companies Handbook 1997 has relevant information on all publicly listed
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firms from 1 January 1996 to 31 December 1996. Updates for 1998 and 2001 were subsequently
completed in late 2002 and early 2003 at the Singapore Exchange (http://www.sgx.com), based
on annual reports of individual companies.
How then did we distinguish the archetypical category of the “Chinese family firm” that
was so often discussed synonymously with Chinese capitalism in the literature? In defining the
Chinese family firm, we took the term “family” to mean persons related by blood or marriage. In
general, the most commonly found relationships are usually that of father and son/daughter,
husband and wife, and brother/sister and brother/sister. This will form the core family unit that
consists of husbands, wives and/or their children. Other relationships may include family
relatives related by blood or marriage, e.g. cousins, uncles, aunts, and so on. We identified all
family relationships in sole or substantial shareholding ownership, be it deemed or direct interest,
of a particular listed Chinese family firms in Singapore. Broadly, we used three criteria to
identify a Chinese family firm listed on the Singapore Exchange. The first and most obvious
condition stipulated Chinese ethnicity for the family or the individual in question. The
determination of ethnicity was done through two ways, firstly, by examining the names on the
board of directors and substantial shareholdings. If the names were of Chinese origin, for
example having a surname of Chen, Tan, or Lee, the criterion was therefore satisfied. The second
way was to confirm through telephone conversations with personnel in the respective listed firms.
The secretary or personal assistant to the chief executive officer or general manager was usually
approached to obtain information about the relevant board of directors and, at other times, to
confirm relationships between several members on the board of directors. Our second criterion in
relation to family ownership was the most important condition without which no evidence could
be presented for a listed firm to be constituted as a “family firm”. Substantial shareholdings listed
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in annual reports were considered in this case. The family (consisting at least two individuals
related by blood or marriage) must be the largest substantial shareholder (be it deemed or direct
interest) in the respective listed firm. This is a much stricter definition of family ownership than
the one used in recent studies of corporate finance and governance because at least two family
members and substantial shareholders must be identified in each case. In these studies, an
individual ownership or blockholder of 10%-20% voting rights was often considered sufficient to
define a family firm (e.g. La Porta et al., 1999; Zang, 1999; 2000; Claessens et al., 2000b). Our
third criteria required family members to occupy important executive positions, e.g. chairman,
chief executive officer, or managing director. This was not a necessary condition because some
listed firms might satisfy the second criterion without satisfying the third. In this case,
professional managers might be employed to take care of the family’s diverse interests.
With the above stated criteria, the pool of publicly listed firms available in the Companies
Handbook 1997 was collated manually and a database was set up to facilitate our empirical
analysis. Variables were identified and data collection could be considered as raw and secondary
in nature, e.g. consulting annual reports, and making references to Companies Handbook 1997
and Singapore’s Corporate Family Tree (Datapool, 1999). The database yielded substantial data
on the internal organization of publicly listed Chinese family firms in Singapore. Although the
database covered only a certain percentage of the entire population of Chinese family firms (i.e.
excluding privately owned Chinese family firms), the findings and observations gleaned from
this kind of analysis can still enrich us about the realities and governance of Chinese family
businesses in Singapore (see also Zang, 1999; 2000). Altogether, the manual exercise of going
through 355 public-listed firms (available from Companies Handbook 1997) yielded a total of
157 Chinese family firms. These family firms made up about 44.2% of the total number of firms
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listed on the Mainboard and Sesdaq of the Stock Exchange of Singapore in 1996. Their combined
activities in 1996 amounted respectively to S$37.2 billion (turnover), S$4.9 billion (after-tax
profits), and S$27.2 billion (fixed assets). About 91% (n=143) of these them also satisfied all
three criteria. By the end of 2001, some significant corporate transformations occurred among 45
of these 157 Chinese family firms. Some 18 of them were acquired by other firms and five of
them were subsequently delisted from the Singapore Exchange. Another 13 were delisted and 14
experienced significant changes in shareholding (n=7) and board of directors (n=7). Their
combined activities in 2001 totaled respectively at S$38.8 billion (turnover), S$4.1 billion (aftertax profits), and S$36.5 billion (fixed assets).
Table 3 presents the distribution of family shareholdings among these 157 Chinese family
firms in 1996, 1998 and 2001. In 1996, about 51.3% (n=77) of them had a majority shareholding
above the 50% threshold. If we take 20% shareholding as the yardstick (see Zang, 1999; 2000),
then an overwhelming majority of Chinese families 93% (n=140) had a substantial stake in these
publicly listed firms. Interestingly, this pattern of family shareholding had not changed very
much by 2001. Some 50.7% (n=69) of them had a majority stake controlled by various families,
although only 84.5% (n=115) had a substantial stake of over 20% shareholding in these firms.
This reduction in substantial stake occurred mainly in the 41%-50% category (7% decrease from
18% in 1996 to 11% in 2001). This finding indicates that corporate restructuring and maneuvers
during and after the 1997/1998 Asian economic crisis had taken their tolls on some publicly
listed firms in which Chinese families did not hold a majority stake. Overall, data in Table 3
point to the relative stability in the shareholding structures of Chinese family firms in Singapore
during the 1996-2001 period. The implications of this stability for corporate performance will be
addressed in the next section.
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******************
Table 3 here
******************
The pattern of principal banks used by these 157 Chinese family firms, however, shows a
rather different picture. In Table 4, there was a significant decrease in the number of principal
banks used by Chinese family firms between 1996 and 2001. In 1996, about 75.7% (n=84) of
Chinese family firms had one to five principal banks. But this figure increased to 82.8% (n=72)
in 2001. Meanwhile, the proportion of these firms having six or more principal banks decreased
over time. This reduction reflects the slowdown in corporate expansion among these Chinese
family firms in the post-crisis era, the mergers and acquisitions in the domestic banking sector
(Keppel Bank and Tat Lee Bank in 1998 and United Overseas Bank and Overseas Union Bank in
2001), and the reserved attitudes of non-Singapore banks towards the short-term growth of these
family firms.
******************
Table 4 here
******************
If we revisit the culturalist perspective on Chinese capitalism, it follows that Chinese
family firms should be more inclined to use network capital to finance their domestic and
international operations. Among small and medium enterprises (SMEs), this network capital
often comes from pooling together investments and savings among family members and an inner
circuit of close friends. In the case of the largest Chinese family firms, so the culturalist literature
proposes, the founders and/or family patriarchs often attempt to use their personal relationships
with other Chinese bankers to secure access to capital and finance. In Singapore’s banking sector
before 1998, only two domestic banks were government-linked (Development Bank of Singapore
and Keppel Bank).5 According to interviews with Chinese entrepreneurs (Yeung, 2002), these
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government-linked banks were notoriously reluctant to extend loans and equity financing to
Chinese family firms. In fact, a local entrepreneur wrote to Singapore’s most read newspaper and
openly complained that “all of them [banks in Singapore] were only interested in property
business and trading – all heavily secured transactions. They had no desire to support a technical
enterprise. The local banks also have limited experience in small and medium-sized enterprise
(SME) operations and venture funding” (The Straits Times, 7 July 1999). All other domestic
banks and finance houses in Singapore prior to 1998 were owned and controlled by leading
Chinese families: Hong Leong Finance (the Kwek family), Industrial and Commercial Bank (the
Wee family), Overseas-Chinese Banking Corporation (the Lee and the Tan family), Overseas
Union Bank (the Lien family), Singapore Finance (the Kwek family), Tat Lee Bank (the Goh
family), and United Overseas Bank (the Wee family).
Given this predominance of Chinese family-owned banks and finance houses in
Singapore’s banking sector, we would expect more Chinese family firms listed on the Singapore
Exchange to use them as their principal banks, particularly those firms with higher shareholding
by Chinese families. This is because majority-owned family firms are more likely to develop
strong personal relationships with Chinese banks and the culturalist perspective would like us to
believe in the positive relationship between family shareholding of family firms and their use of
Chinese banks. In Table 5, I present results from a simple correlation analysis of the relationship
between percentages of family shareholding and the number of Singapore banks as principal
banks. My assumption is that greater family shareholding should correspond with higher use of
Singapore banks (as a proxy for Chinese family banks). Ironically, the correlation analysis does
not support the culturalist perspective on the alleged positive relationship between family
shareholding and the use of Chinese banks as principal banks. Indeed, there is a consistently
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negative relationship for all three years of 1996, 1998 and 2001 (statistically significant in four
out of six cases). This finding indicates that the higher is the family share of a publicly listed
Chinese family firm, the less is its number of Singapore (Chinese) banks as principal banks. It
refutes tentatively the culturalist interpretation of network capital as the dominant source of
financing Chinese capitalism.
******************
Table 5 here
******************
So what sorts of banks did these Chinese family firms use as their principal banks? I have
summarized in tables 6 and 7 the geographical origins of principal banks of Chinese family firms
by country and by region. Two empirical observations clearly stand out. First, the majority of
principal banks are from outside Singapore. In 1996, only 14 out of 76 principal banks (18.5%)
were from Singapore (Table 6) and this figure decreased by 50% to only seven Singapore banks
in 2001, an outcome of the mega mergers and acquisitions during the 1998-2001 period. In Table
7, however, this small number of Singapore banks accounted for a disproportionately higher
number of citations as principal banks by Chinese family firms. In 1996, the 14 Singapore banks
made up 45.1% (n=222) of total citations (N=492) by the 111 Chinese family firms that indicated
principal banks in their annual reports. Following the decline in the number of Singapore banks
available as principal banks in 2001, the citation of Singapore banks also decreased by 27% to
162 in 2001, whereas its relative share of citations remained stable at 45.4%. This result shows
that during the period 1996-2001, fewer Singapore banks were available as principal banks for
listed Chinese family firms, though the former enjoyed a relatively higher share of the citations.
******************
Tables 6 and 7 here
******************
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Second, the geographical scope of principal banks is highly diverse, ranging from the
more obscure bank in South Africa (Amalgamated Banks of South Africa) and the Middle East
(Arab Banking) to such globalized banks as Citibank (US) and the HSBC (UK). What is
particularly interesting in Table 6 is the fact that Chinese family firms have well tapped into
banks from North America and Western Europe as their principal banks. In 1996, banks from
North America (n=11) and Western Europe (n=23) accounted for 43.4% of the total pool of
principal banks (N=76). In terms of citations in Table 7, the two regions also made up 37.6%
(n=185) of total citations. These findings imply that prior to the 1997/1998 Asian economic
crisis, banks from North America and Western Europe were highly active in financing and
servicing both the domestic and international operations of Chinese family firms from Singapore.
In turn, this shows that Chinese capitalism in Singapore has been globalizing in its financial
outreach during the past decade – a point certainly not anticipated in the existing literature on
Chinese capitalism. Together with banks from East Asia, Australasia and other regions, nonSingapore banks contributed to almost 55% of total citations as principal banks.
By 2001, however, there were some significant changes to the above geographical
patterns of principal banks. The number of banks available as principal banks decreased by
21.1% from 76 in 1996 to only 60 in 2001 (Table 6). The decline occurred primarily among
banks from North America (from 11 in 1996 to 5 in 2001), Japan (from 7 in 1996 to 4 in 2001),
and Singapore (from 14 in 1996 to 7 in 2001). To a certain extent, this decrease correlates with
the 15.3% decline in the number of Chinese family firms indicating their principal banks (Table
4). It also reflects the negative impact of the Asian economic crisis on the Asian operations of
American and Japanese banks, and the tendency among Chinese family firms to use less principal
banks as they streamlined their operations and restructured their core business activities. In terms
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of citations in 2001 (Table 7), banks from all regions except Australasia experienced a dramatic
reduction in their citations as principal banks of Chinese family firms, although their relative
percentage shares remained unchanged. The decline ranged from 25.7% for banks from Southeast
Asia to 33.3% for banks from North America. Banks from Singapore and outside Singapore had
similar drop in their citations (around 27%). These figures are all well above the 15.3% decrease
in Chinese family firms indicating principal banks in their annual reports, pointing tentatively to
the general tendency among these firms to use less principal banks during the 1996-2001 period.

Economic Crisis and Performance
The above descriptive analysis of the Singapore Exchange data challenges the
conventional wisdom that Chinese family firms rely exclusively on kinship ties and network
capital to finance their business activities. It shows that Chinese family firms listed on the
Singapore Exchange have a diversified pool of principal banks and higher family shareholding
does not necessarily reduce the proportion of non-Singapore banks as principal banks. It remains
unclear how these findings relate to the corporate performance of these firms during the 19962001 period when many East and Southeast Asian economies experienced their worst-ever
financial crisis and instability (see different interpretations in Krugman, 1998; Radelet and Sachs,
1998; Wade and Veneroso, 1998; Johnson et al., 2000; Wade, 2002). Before we explore these
relationships, it is useful to give a general idea of the extent to which the 1997/1998 Asian
economic crisis has impacted on the profitability of these 157 Chinese family firms. In 1996,
these firms enjoyed a combined after-tax profit at S$4.8 billion. In 1998, however, the figure
decreased very significantly by 62.5% to S$1.8 billion. Data presented in Table 8 reveals clearly
that while 144 (91.7%) of these 157 Chinese family firms enjoyed after-tax profits in 1996, only
95 (60.5%) of them did so in 1998. There is thus no question that a large number of publicly
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listed Chinese family firms in Singapore suffered serious losses from the 1997/1998 Asian
economic crisis.
******************
Table 8 here
******************
The more significant question is whether there are relationships between the role of
family ownership and profitability, and between the use of principal banks and profitability. This
question can potentially inform our understanding of the critical perspective on Asian financial
markets that involve the participation of Chinese family firms as both providers and recipients of
financial capital and services. For it might be argued, as the critics of crony capitalism would
certainly have, that the more a publicly listed firm is owned and controlled by a family, the more
likely it is to suffer from major losses during the Asian economic crisis. This is because, so the
argument goes, family control could result in unwieldy diversification and investment decisions
made by the founders and/or the patriarchs in their own personal or family interests rather than
the interests of minority shareholders and the public companies in which they have invested.
Tightly coupled family ownership and control also tends to generate poorer corporate governance
and greater likelihood of expropriation of minority shareholders in the event of financial
difficulties and crises. Such an argument against family control of public companies is extremely
influential during the post-crisis restructuring of many Asian financial markets (e.g. in South
Korea and Indonesia).
In Table 9, I use family shareholding as a proxy to measure the extent of family
ownership and control and correlate the percentage of family shareholding with after-tax profits.
Correlation analysis is useful here as it tells us about the direction of change between two
different variables. Since I am not interested in predicting the causality of the exact change (as in
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regression analysis), correlation analysis is a sufficient tool for my purpose. Although the
corporate finance literature often uses return on assets (ROA) or return on invested capital
(ROIC) as the proxy for profitability and performance (e.g. Carney and Gedajlovic, 2002; Mitton,
2002), I use after-tax profits as a simplified proxy for performance in my correlation analysis.
The results presented in Table 9 seem to support the above argument by the critics of Chinese
capitalism that there are negative correlations between family shareholding and after-tax profits.
Indeed, in all three years under examination (1996, 1998 and 2001), there is a negative
correlation between family shareholding and after-tax profits. The results for three particular
cases are also statistically significant. What these results imply is that higher family shareholding
of a Chinese family firm seems to correlate with lower after-tax profits or higher losses during
the 1996-2001 period.
My evidence also lends some support to the conclusions in several recent studies on the
relationship between family ownership and corporate performance. In a study of 106 Chinese
family firms listed on the Hong Kong Stock Exchange in 1993, Carney and Gedajlovic (2002:
137) identified statistically significant positive relationships between tighter coupling of family
ownership and control and dividends payouts, and negative relationships between tight coupling
of ownership and control and investment in fixed assets. Their findings suggested that tighter
family ownership and control leads to lower likelihood of corporate profitability due to higher
dividend payouts and lower investment in fixed assets. Claessens et al.’s (2000a; 2000b) World
Bank study of over 5,500 East Asian firms in nine economies during the 1988-1996 period also
shows that family control helps explain the negative relationship between control rights and
market evaluation. In another study of the 1997-1998 performance of 398 firms from the five
crisis countries (Indonesia, South Korea, Malaysia, the Philippines and Thailand), Mitton (2002:

23

229) suggested the idea that blockholders of shares who are also involved with management
could have more opportunity or incentive for expropriation of minority shareholders. Claessens et
al. (1999) also observed that family ownership tends to reduce the likelihood of an East Asian
firm to file for bankruptcy, possibly at the expense of minority shareholders. This relationship
thus explains the survival of some family firms despite their lower or negative profitability during
the crisis.
******************
Table 9 here
******************
Going back to my earlier point about the financing of Chinese capitalism in a global era,
it might be useful to speculate on the relationship between the use of principal banks by Chinese
family firms and their profitability. My proposition is that a Chinese family firm using more and
geographically diversified principal banks before the crisis is more likely to make profits and less
susceptible to losses arising from the crisis. This positive relationship can be explained by two
rationales. First, different principal banks may offer different financial services and investment
knowledge to a Chinese family firm. This is a point about risk diversification from the
perspective of the recipients of credits and funds and thus a diversified base of principal banks
allows these recipients to perform a more effective assessment of the global investment climate
and credit availability before the onset of the crisis. An excessive reliance on a single or a few
principal banks may reduce the potential repertoire of market information and financial
knowledge available among a diverse pool of principal banks. Second, the role of personal
relationships and relationship banking is less likely to be effective when the number of principal
banks increases, thereby reducing the propensity for expropriation and fraud before the crisis.
Different principal banks may have divergent credit requirements and risk-assessment procedures
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that put significant constraints on both corporate governance and investment strategies of a
Chinese family firm. We can thus infer that through diversifying principal banks, a Chinese
family firm wants to tap into the financial strength and knowledge of the chosen principal banks
rather than to secure capital and credits through personal relationships. This kind of Chinese
family firms is also more likely to engage in professional management, impersonal decisionmakings and sound corporate governance.
In Table 10, I correlate the total number of principal banks of Chinese family firms and
their after-tax profits in all three years. The positive and statistically significant correlations
between the number of principal banks and after-tax profits in 1996 and 1998 support my
proposition that a larger number of principal banks before the crisis might lead to higher
propensity for profitability in a Chinese family firm during the crisis. There is apparently a
difference between the use of Singapore and non-Singapore banks as principal banks. Although
both types of principal banks are positively correlated with the after-tax profits of Chinese family
firms in 1996, the number of non-Singapore principal banks remains positively correlated with
after-tax profits in 1998. The negative correlation between the number of Singapore principal
banks and after-tax profits in 1998 seems to imply that the direct involvement of Chinese family
banks in Singapore’s corporate sector has a negative impact on profitability during the crisis.
Taken together, these findings establish the significant role of a diversified pool and geographical
origin of principal banks in ensuring profitability and corporate governance of Chinese family
firms. To a certain extent, it explains why many Chinese family firms have moved away from the
traditional model of financing their business activities through “network capital”. There are clear
benefits for those Chinese family firms that rely less on the culture of “familism” and more on
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the culture of professionalism and sound governance structures through their diversification of
principal banks beyond other Chinese family banks.
******************
Table 10 here
******************

Conclusion
The debate on the cultural origins and predispositions of Chinese family firms and their
business activities remains elusive because so much of the literature relies on static analysis that
tends to produce cultural stereotypes and essentialist observations. In this ongoing debate, the
powerful role of financial markets as both the vanguard of capitalism and the diffusion center of
new management norms and regulatory influences has been largely neglected. In this paper, I
have challenged the conventional wisdom in the literature on Chinese capitalism that
essentializes the ways in which Chinese family firms finance their business activities. Drawing
on a large dataset on 157 Chinese family firms listed on the Singapore Exchange, I have shown
that several cultural stereotypes about these firms and their financial arrangements are out-dated,
to say the least. As major players in Chinese capitalism, these firms have enormous corporate and
financial power to effect dynamic changes in the nature and organization of the domestic
economy of Singapore. I have provided relevant data and conducted statistical analysis on their
shareholding structures, the geographical origins of their principal banks, and their after-tax
profits during the 1996-2001 period. I have found good evidence to support my two initial
propositions that these Chinese family firms have indeed been globalizing their sources of capital
and this globalization process has certainly contributed to their corporate performance. These
propositions are particularly significant in the context of the 1997/1998 Asian economic crisis
during which severe criticisms were leveled against the so-called “crony capitalism” as the
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fundamental cause of the crisis. While this paper does not add any new empirical evidence to
explaining the cause of the crisis, it does clarify an important issue about the relationship between
family control of public companies and their poor performance during and after the crisis.
As financial markets in Asia are recovering from the 1997/1998 crisis and new norms of
corporate finance and legitimation procedures are emerging in these markets, my empirical
analysis may offer some relevant implications for both researchers and practitioners. First of all,
if culture were to remain as a useful analytical category, we must conceptualize it as a set of
social practices that adapt to and change with time and place. While cultural norms – as in the
case of Chinese family firms – might be influential in determining their relationships with
financial markets during particular historical moments and in certain geographical contexts, these
norms can evolve and change in unpredictable directions. The 1990s, for example, witnessed a
heightened intensity of the globalization processes that put many cultural norms in distress (see
Berger and Huntington, 2002). The traditional practice of Chinese family firms in the financial
realm was to rely virtually exclusively on pooling capital among family members and close
friends. Such a cultural model of financing Chinese family firms remains pervasive today among
mostly small and medium enterprises. However, as financial capital becomes increasingly
globalized and many more Chinese family firms are seeking capital on a much larger scale, we
begin to witness new norms of corporate finance among large and often publicly listed Chinese
family firms. These norms include the use of non-Chinese banking and financial institutions for
access to global finance and the decline in the reliance on network capital and personal
relationships. Whether these norms in financing Chinese capitalism will constitute a new culture
of finance remains unclear. But in today’s globalizing era, it is clearly absurd to deny any
changes and transformations in the nature and organization of Chinese capitalism. What this
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paper has shown is that there is much for us to learn from researching into the interactions
between Chinese family firms and regional/global financial markets.
In terms of practice, my analysis implies that family ownership and control might not be
too much a regulatory hazard if an informal regulatory process through various stakeholders such
as principal banks can be put in place. The effectiveness of such informal regulatory process may
explain why more than 75% of all registered companies in the industrialized economies remain
family businesses and a third of listed companies in the Fortune 500 have families at their helm
(Becht et al., 2003). Even in the UK where ownership is rapidly dispersed throughout the
twentieth century, Franks et al. (2003) found that founding families retained board control well
beyond the sale of their ownership stake (see also Chandler, 1990). According to a recent study
of corporate ownership around the world (La Porta et al., 1999: 481), even Microsoft Corporation
has been classified as a family-owned firm, 23.7% controlled by Bill Gates. Prima facie, there are
thus no inherent limits to the growth of family firms in an era of global finance (Yeung, 2000c).
In fact, if such informal process works well, shareholders of Chinese family firms – both majority
and minority – might benefit from better corporate governance and improved profitability. This
potential improvement in corporate governance is particularly significant in developing
economies in which many Chinese family firms thrive and shareholder protection and judicial
efficiency are inadequate. Klapper and Love (2002), for example, found that good corporate
governance matters a lot more in countries with weak shareholder protection and poor judicial
efficiency. In this sense, the latent pressures from principal banks may foster a kind of voluntary
action on the part of Chinese family firms to take a stakeholder approach, rather than a personal
or family approach, to corporate governance and performance. This process happens in many
East and Southeast Asian economies in which banks play a critical role in financial
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intermediation (see Table 1). There is no question about the future increase in the extent to which
Chinese capitalism works with global finance. The critical issue is whether such a co-evolution of
Chinese capitalism and global finance can take place within the existing framework of the global
financial architecture in which financial crises and instabilities seem to be rather prevalent.
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Endnotes
1

I use “home” in inverted commas because many East and Southeast Asian economies might not

be the birthplace for the first and, sometimes, second generations of many ethnic Chinese people.
Unless otherwise specified, the term “economies” is used in lieu of “countries” because while
economies like Hong Kong and Taiwan are populated by the largest concentration of ethnic
Chinese outside mainland China, it is hotly debatable whether they can be known as “countries”
in their own right.
2

The term “overseas Chinese” may be contentious to some scholars of ethnic Chinese who are

living outside mainland China. The term is related to the Chinese term huaqiao (Chinese national
abroad) which has been sharply criticised in Southeast China for its implications that Chinese
born abroad with status as a citizen in another nation are still Chinese in essence and huaren
(ethnic Chinese) has become more politically acceptable. In English, overseas Chinese is usually
used to include huaqiao, huaren, and residents of Taiwan, Hong Kong and Macau (tong bao)
who are considered to compatriots living in parts of the territory of China temporarily outside
mainland Chinese control. See Wang (1991; 2000) and Ma (2003) for the origin and status of
ethnic Chinese living outside mainland China. Throughout this paper, I will refer to “ethnic
Chinese” or to specific groups (e.g. Hong Kong entrepreneurs) rather than “overseas Chinese” in
my discussions of research materials. But references to the literature sometimes require reference
to “overseas Chinese” to be clear. In such cases, I will use inverted quotations to illustrate my
discomfort with the term.
3

See, for example, the collapse of Peregrine Investment Holdings from Hong Kong in Yeung

(1999).
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4

See, for example, Wong (1988), Redding (1990), Hamilton (1991), Menkhoff (1993), Chan and

Chiang (1994), East Asia Analytical Unit (1995), Lever-Tracy et al. (1996), Weidenbaum and
Hughes (1996), Hefner (1998), Douw et al. (1999; 2001), Chan (2000), Gomez and Hsiao (2001),
Menkhoff and Gerke (2002) and Yao (2002).
5

The third government-linked bank was the Post Office Savings Bank (POSB) that was merged

with the Development Bank of Singapore in July 1998 (Yeung, 2000b). As a savings bank, the
POSB did not involve much in corporate loans to Chinese family firms.
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TABLE 1. The Nature of Banks in Selected Asian and Developed Economies, 1994-1995
Economy

Bank Share in
Financial
Intermediation1

State-Owned
Banks (% of
total assets)

Foreign Banks
(% of total
assets)

Non-Interest
Operating
Costs2

Net Interest
Margins2

Hong Kong
Singapore
Indonesia
Malaysia
Taiwan
Thailand

71
91
64
80
75

0
0
48
8
57
7

783
80
4
16
5
7

1.5
1.4
2.4
1.6
1.3
1.9

2.2
1.6
3.3
3.0
2.0
3.7

South Korea
Japan
Germany
United States

38
79
77
23

13
0
503
0

5
2
4
22

1.7
0.8
1.1
3.7

2.1
1.1
1.4
3.7

1

Assets as a percentage of the assets of banks and non-bank financial institutions.
As a percentage of total assets, averaged over the 1990-1994 period.
3
Not directly comparable to percentages for other countries.
Source: Guillén (2001: Table 7.1; 185).
2
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TABLE 2. Financial Markets and Institutions in Hong Kong and Singapore, 1960-1999 (in
$million)
Growth Rate (%)
Hong Kong
Number of banks
Per 1,000 population
Total bank loans (HK$)
Manufacturing (%)
General Commerce
Financial industries
Transport & Comm.
Construction
Individuals
For business
Prime rates (%)
Stock market turnover
Ratio to GDP at current prices
(%)
Singapore
Number of banks
Per 1,000 population
Total bank loans (S$)
Manufacturing (%)
General Commerce
Financial industries
Transport & Comm.
Construction
Individuals
Prime rates (%)
Stock market turnover
Ratio to GDP at
current prices
(%)
Contributions to central provident
fund (S$)
Ratio to GCF at
current prices
(%)

Annual Figures

1961- 1967- 1980- 199067
80
90
98

1961

1967

1980

1990
599
10.6

1998
544
8.1

4.0
-

-1.0
-

59
1.9

75
1.9

415
8.1

-

157.2 41.3
-

20.4
-

6.0

5401
19.8
31.4
3.1
4.1
16.4
13.1
5.3
7.5

124287
10.7
25.9
5.3
9.3
15.5
19.7
5.1
13.5

689369 1957752
4.8
7.2
9.2
10.8
11.8
15.2
5.4
6.0
21.3
15.7
37.4
30.0
1.2
3.2
9.94
10.5

11.2
-

2232 18.3
-

54.4
-

1414.2
19.0

305.2
2.0

95684
67.5

288715 1701112
134.2
49.6

1980

1990

54.0
-

3.9
-

1962- 1970- 1980- 199070
80
90
99

1962

1970

1999

-

-

4.1
-

0.9
-

-

-

97
4.0

141
4.7

154
4.0

21.8
-

75.7
-

16.9
-

15.5
-

731.1
12.8
51.6
6.7
2.7
2.6
-

2167.7
34.1
31.3
3.6
1.5
8.4
13.1
8.00

20206.9
21.6
39.3
10.4
6.4
9.3
7.0
13.60

57696.4
13.0
23.7
17.2
3.0
22.3
13.4
7.73

-

85.9
-

51.9
-

11.4
-

-

746.9
12.9

7806.1
31.1

36756.0
55.3

147178
7.9
13.5
14.3
2.5
39.8
14.7
5.80
1998
74479.4
52.7

45.7 124.4

19.3

13.7

30.6

156.4

2296.0

7174.2

16000.4

-

-

-

9.6

7.0

19.7

29.5

33.9

-

Sources: Census and Statistics Department (various years); Monetary Authority of Singapore
(various years).
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TABLE 3.

Family
Shareholdings
(%)
1 – 10
11 – 20
21 – 30
31 – 40
41 – 50
50.01 – 60
61 – 70
71 – 80
81 – 90
91 – 100
Total
NA

Distribution of Family Shareholdings Among Chinese Family
Firms Listed on the Singapore Exchange, 1996, 1998 and 2001
Number and Percentage
1998
2001

1996

Change
between 1996
and 2001 (%)

0 (0.0)
10 (6.7)
23 (15.3)
13 (8.7)
27 (18.0)
30 (20.0)
23 (15.3)
16 (10.7)
7 (4.7)
1 (0.6)
150 (100)

3 (2.1)
14 (9.7)
24 (16.7)
14 (9.7)
19 (13.2)
28 (19.4)
21 (14.6)
13 (9.0)
6 (4.2)
2 (1.4)
144 (100)

6 (4.4)
15 (11.0)
20 (14.7)
11 (8.1)
15 (11.0)
29 (21.3)
18 (13.2)
10 (7.4)
11 (8.1)
1 (0.7)
136 (100)

4.4
4.3
-0.6
-0.6
-7.0
1.3
-2.1
-3.3
3.4
0.1
-

7

13

21

-

Source: Author’s compilation from annual reports of companies.
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TABLE 4. Chinese Family Firms Listed on the Singapore Exchange and Their Principal
Banks, 1996, 1998 and 2001
(percentage in parentheses)
No. of
principal
banks

1996

Number and Percentage
1998
2001

Change
between 1996
and 2001 (%)

1–5
6 – 10
11 – 15
16 – 20
21 – 25
26 – 30
Subtotal

84 (75.7)
19 (17.1)
6 (5.4)
1 (0.9)
0 (0.0)
1 (0.9)
111 (100)

77 (78.6)
16 (16.3)
3 (3.1)
1 (1.1)
0 (0.0)
1 (1.1)
98 (100)

72 (82.8)
12 (13.8)
2 (2.3)
0 (0.0)
0 (0.0)
1 (1.1)
87(100)

7.1
-3.3
-3.1
-0.9
0.0
0.2
-15.3

No indicated
principal banks
Total

46 (29.3)

59 (37.6)

70 (44.6)

15.3

157 (100)

157 (100)

157 (100)

-

Source: Author’s compilation from annual reports of companies.
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TABLE 5. Correlation Between Percentages of Family Shareholding
and the Number of Singapore Banks as Principal Banks of Chinese Family Firms Listed on
the Singapore Exchange, 1996, 1998 and 2001
Independent
Variables
Family Share
percentage, 1996

Family Share
percentage, 1998

Family Share
percentage, 2001

No. of Singapore Banks as Principal Banks
1996
1998
2001
Pearson
Correlation
Sig. (2-tailed)
N

-.270**

-.306**

-.146

.005
107

.003
92

.190
82

Pearson
Correlation
Sig. (2-tailed)
N

-

-.352**

-.181

-

.001
93

.102
83

-

-

-.220*

-

-

.042
86

Pearson
Correlation
Sig. (2-tailed)
N

* Correlation is significant at the 0.05 level (2-tailed).
** Correlation is significant at the 0.01 level (2-tailed).
Source: Author’s compilation from annual reports of companies.
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TABLE 6. Country of Origin of Principal Banks of Chinese Family Firms Listed on the
Singapore Exchange, 1996, 1998 and 2001
(percentage in parentheses)
Origins of principal
banks
Canada & US

Number and Percentage
1998
2001

1996

Change
between 1996
and 2001 (%)

11 (14.5)

11 (15.3)

5 (8.3)

-54.5

Australia & New Zealand

3 (3.9)

3 (4.2)

4 (6.7)

33.3

France
Germany
Luxemborg &
Switzerland
The Netherlands
UK

3 (3.9)
7 (9.2)
4 (5.3)

5 (6.9)
7 (9.7)
4 (5.6)

5 (8.3)
6 (10.0)
2 (3.3)

66.7
-14.3
-50.0

4 (5.3)
5 (6.6)

3 (4.2)
5 (6.9)

4 (6.7)
5 (8.3)

0.0
0.0

China
Hong Kong SAR
Japan
Malaysia
Singapore

3 (3.9)
4 (5.3)
7 (9.2)
7 (9.2)
14 (18.5)

4 (5.6)
4 (5.6)
4 (5.6)
7 (9.7)
12 (16.7)

4 (6.7)
4 (6.7)
4 (6.7)
6 (10.0)
7 (11.7)

33.3
0.0
-42.9
-14.3
-50.0

4 (5.4)

3 (4.2)

4 (6.7)

0.0

76 (100)

72 (100)

60 (100)

-21.1

Others
Total

Source: Author’s compilation from annual reports of companies.
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TABLE 7. Regional Origins of Principal Banks Cited by Chinese Family Firms Listed on
the Singapore Exchange, 1996, 1998 and 2001
(percentage in parentheses)
Origins of
principal banks

Number of Citations and Percentages
1996
1998
2001

Absolute Change
between 1996 and
2001 (%)

Southeast Asia
Western Europe
North America
East Asia
Australasia
Other regions
Total

268 (54.5)
140 (28.5)
45 (9.1)
34 (6.9)
5 (1.0)
0 (0.0)
492 (100)

235 (55.0)
123 (28.8)
40 (9.4)
24 (5.6)
4 (0.9)
1 (0.2)
427 (100)

199 (55.7)
99 (27.7)
30 (8.4)
23 (6.4)
5 (1.4)
1 (0.3)
357 (100)

-25.7
-29.3
-33.3
-32.4
0.0
-27.4

Singapore
Outside Singapore

222 (45.1)
270 (54.9)

199 (46.6)
228 (53.4)

162 (45.4)
195 (54.6)

-27.0
-27.8

Source: Author’s compilation from annual reports of companies.
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TABLE 8.

Profit and Loss Among Chinese Family Firms Listed on the
Singapore Exchange, 1996, 1998 and 2001

Profit and Loss

Profit
Loss
NA
Total

1996

Number and Percentage
1998

2001

144 (91.7)
13 (8.3)
0 (0.0)
157 (100)

95 (60.5)
54 (34.4)
8 (5.1)
157 (100)

101 (64.3)
39 (24.8)
17 (10.8)
157 (100)

Source: Author’s compilation from annual reports of companies.
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TABLE 9. Correlation Between Percentages of Family Shareholding
and After Tax Profits of Chinese Family Firms Listed on the Singapore Exchange, 1996,
1998 and 2001
Independent
Variables
Family Share
percentage, 1996

Family Share
percentage, 1998

Family Share
percentage, 2001

1996

Profits after tax
1998

2001

Pearson
Correlation
Sig. (2-tailed)
N

-.203*

-.132

-.170*

.013
150

.116
142

.050
133

Pearson
Correlation
Sig. (2-tailed)
N

-

-.115

-.188*

-

.170
144

.028
136

-

-

-.093

-

-

.278
137

Pearson
Correlation
Sig. (2-tailed)
N

* Correlation is significant at the 0.05 level (2-tailed).
Source: Author’s compilation from annual reports of companies.
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TABLE 10. Correlation Between the Use of Principal Banks
and
After Tax Profits of Chinese Family Firms Listed on the Singapore Exchange, 1996, 1998
and 2001
Independent Variables
1996
Total No. of Principal
Banks, 1996

Profits after tax
1998

2001

Pearson
Correlation
Sig. (2-tailed)
N

.970**

.841**

.937**

.000
158

.000
150

.000
141

Pearson
Correlation
Sig. (2-tailed)
N

-

.842**

.937**

-

.000
150

.000
141

-

-

.936**

-

-

.000
141

Pearson
Correlation
Sig. (2-tailed)
N

.969**

.841**

.934**

.000
158

.000
150

.000
141

No. of Singapore banks Pearson
as Principal Banks, 1996 Correlation
Sig. (2-tailed)
N

.968**

.838**

.938**

.000
157

.000
149

.000
140

Total No. of Principal
Banks, 1998

Total No. of Principal
Banks, 2001

No. of non-Singapore
Principal Banks, 1996

Pearson
Correlation
Sig. (2-tailed)
N

** Correlation is significant at the 0.01 level (2-tailed).
Source: Author’s compilation from annual reports of companies.
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